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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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What causes developing countries to receive different 
levels of international remittances? This paper addresses 
this question by using new data on such variables as 
the skill composition of migrants, poverty, and interest 
and exchange rates to examine the determinants of 
remittances. The paper finds that the skill composition 
of migrants does matter in remittance determination.  
This paper—a product of the Development Prospects Group, Development Economics Department—is part of a larger 
effort to understand the determinants of international remittances in the developing world. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at radams@worldbank.org.  
Countries which export a larger share of high-skilled 
(educated) migrants receive less per capita remittances 
than countries which export a larger proportion of low-
skilled migrants. It also finds that the level of poverty in a 
labor-sending country does not have a positive impact on 
the level of remittances received.   
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International remittances refer to the money and goods that are transmitted to 
households by migrant workers working outside of their origin countries.  At the start of 
the 21
st Century these resource transfers represent one of the key issues in economic 
development.  In 2004 official international remittances were estimated at $93 billion per 
year (Ratha, 2004),
1 making them about twice as large as the level of official aid-related 
flows to developing countries. 
Despite the ever-increasing size of official international remittances, relatively 
little attention has been paid to the demographic, economic and financial determinants of 
these resource flows at the country level.   The basic question here is simple:  What 
causes different developing countries to receive different levels of remittances?  What is 
the impact of such factors as the skill composition of migrants and the level of poverty in 
labor-sending countries on the amount of international remittances received?  At the same 
time, how do economic, financial and political factors – like level of country income, 
interest rates and exchange rates -- affect the level of remittances received by countries?   
This paper proposes to answer these, and similar, questions using a new data set 
composed of 76 developing countries.  This data set includes all those labor-sending 
countries for which reasonable information on the skill composition of migrants, poverty, 
remittances and other financial and political factors could be assembled.  The data set 
includes countries drawn from each major region of the developing world:  Latin 
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America and the Caribbean, Middle East and North Africa, Europe and Central Asia, East 
Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia. 
The balance of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 sets the stage by 
reviewing the findings of recent studies on the demographic, economic and financial 
determinants of international remittances.  Section 3 presents the new data set, and 
Section 4 uses the new data to econometrically examine the determinants of remittances.  
To control for possible endogenity bias, this section employs an instrumental variables 
(IV) strategy to isolate the overall relationship between remittances, the skill level of 
migration, migration stock and poverty.  Controlling for all other factors, this approach 
finds that high-skilled migrants tend to remit less to labor-sending countries, and that 
low-skilled migrants tend to remit more.   The final section, Section 5, summarizes the 
findings. 
 
2.  Recent Studies on the Determinants of International Remittances 
  Two approaches dominate the recent literature on the determinants of 
international remittances:  one approach focusing on microeconomic variables, and the 
other focusing on more macroeconomic factors.  At the microeconomic level, Lucas and 
Stark (1985) were the first to elaborate a formal model for analyzing the remittances of 
migrant workers.  These authors hypothesized that migrant workers are motivated to 
remit for a variety of reasons, ranging from pure altruism to pure self-interest.  According 
to Lucas and Stark (1985), migrant workers can be classified as altruistic if their 
remittances increase with declines in family income at home, while self-interest motives 
would be considered dominant if remittances were positively related with family income 
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at home.  Recent efforts to test the altruistic vs. self-interest hypothesis with respect to 
remittances at the micro-economic level include Agarwal and Horowitz (2002), Foster 
and Rosenzweig (2001) and Ilahi and Jafarey (1999).   
  At the same time, other researchers have used aggregate data to analyze the 
macroeconomic factors that affect the behavior of remitters.  These researchers have 
suggested that macroeconomic factors – like interest rates, exchange rates and political 
instability – all have an impact on the level of international remittances received by 
countries (Higgins et al, 2004, El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Glytsos, 1997; and Faini, 
1994).  These analysts typically find that interest and exchange rates need to be 
competitive and that countries need to be politically stable in order encourage the flow of 
remittances to labor-sending countries.   
  The analysis pursued in this paper attempts to combine the microeconomic and 
macroeconomic approaches to remittance determination by doing two things.  First, the 
analysis adds a new (and important) variable into the modeling effort: poverty.  Because 
of the lack of poverty data for many developing countries, no past study has attempted to 
analyze how the level of poverty in a labor-sending country affects the level of 
international remittances received.  On the one hand, since remittances are largely 
individual transfers, made from a migrant to his family back home, it might be argued 
that the poverty of the household is a more important determinant of remittances than the 
poverty of the country.  However, since the poverty data used in this paper is based on 
the results of nationally-representative household surveys in particular labor-sending 
countries; such data represents a useful means for identifying how country-level poverty 
affects the level of international remittances received by countries.  If, for example, 
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migrant workers are altruistic, more country-level poverty at home should encourage 
them to remit more money.   
  Second, this paper uses macro-economic data on the skill composition of migrants 
to examine how the type of workers sent abroad by a country – educated or uneducated, 
skilled or unskilled – affects the level of remittances received by that country.  Until 
recently, the lack of country-level data on the skill composition of migrants has prevented 
much meaningful work on this issue.
2  At the micro-economic level, some past studies 
have suggested that (holding all other factors constant) more educated migrants remit 
more because they typically earn more (Banerjee, 1984).  However, other micro-
economic studies have found that more educated migrants remit less because they have 
lower propensities to return to their origin country (Rapoport and Docquier, 2004).  
Using country-level data on the skill composition of migrants can help clarify which of 
these predictions is correct.   
 
3.  New Data on the Determinants of International Remittances 
  As noted above, this study is based on a new data set that includes information on 
remittances, poverty, country income, the skill level of migrants and other economic and 
financial variables for 76 “low-income and middle-income” developing countries.
3   
These countries were selected because it was possible to find relevant data on all of these 
variables for the period 1995 to 2001.  Since it was not easy to assemble this data set, and 
several problems still plague this (and all other) data sets on international remittances, it 
is important to spell out how this information was assembled. 
   6
  The data on international remittances in this paper come from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) publication, Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.  This 
publication records the annual amount of international remittances received by each  
labor-sending country.
4  However, it should be emphasized that these IMF records are 
incomplete because they only include data on official international remittance flows, that 
is, remittance monies which are transmitted through official banking channels.  In 
virtually every labor-sending country a large (and unknown) proportion of remittance 
monies is transmitted through private, unrecorded channels.  These private transfers 
include remittances brought home by friends, relatives and even the migrant himself.  As 
a result, the level of international remittances recorded by the IMF significantly 
underestimates the actual flow of remittances (official and unofficial) returning to labor-
sending countries.
5  
  All of the poverty data used in this paper comes from the results of nationally-
representative household budget surveys, as recorded on the World Bank website, Povcal 
Net.  One of the problems with these poverty data is that many developing countries have 
not conducted the type of household budget surveys needed to produce reliable poverty 
figures.  For example, of the 157 developing countries classified as low- or middle-
income by the World Bank,
6 only 81 countries (52%) have published the results of any 
household budget survey.  Of these 81 countries, missing data on international 
remittances reduced the sample used here to 76.  However, not all of these 76 countries 
conducted household surveys in the year 2000, which is the year for which all the data on 
the skill composition of migrants are available (see below).  As a result, all the poverty 
data used in this study comes from that single household survey which was done closest 
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to the year 2000 during the 6-year period, 1995 to 2001.  Countries which did household 
surveys before 1995 are not included in the data set. 
With respect to the skill composition of migrants, few (if any) of the developing 
countries in the world publish accurate records on the number of international migrants 
that they produce.  It is therefore necessary to estimate migration information by using 
data collected in the main labor-receiving countries of the world.  For the purposes of this 
paper, the main labor-receiving countries (regions) include two:  OECD (America), 
including United States and Canada; and OECD (Europe), excluding America and Asia.
7  
Unfortunately, no data are available on the level of worker migration to the third most 
important labor-receiving region in the world, the Persian Gulf.  This is unfortunate 
because large numbers of workers from the Middle East and South Asia go to work in the 
Persian Gulf. 
In the past there has been a lack of disaggregated data on the skill composition of 
migrant stocks and flows.  However, a new data set compiled by Docquier and Marfouk 
(2005) classifies international migrants from each country according to their level of 
educational attainment:  low-skilled (less than 8 years of schooling); medium-skilled (9 to 
12 years of schooling); and high-skilled (13 years or more of schooling).  This data set, 
which is based on population census and register data from nearly every OECD country, 
counts as international migrants all those who are “foreign born”  and of working age (25 
years and over), who are living in either the OECD (America) or OECD (Europe).   
This paper uses the Docquier and Marfouk (2005) data to analyze how the skill 
(educational) level of migrants from different developing countries affects the flow of 
international remittances to these countries.  However, like all data sets on international 
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migration, the Docquier and Marfouk (2005) data contain several important limitations.  
Most notably, by focusing on information collected from census and register data, these 
data do not capture the very large number of illegal and irregular migrants living and 
working in the OECD.  For example, in 2002 the stock of illegal immigrants in the 
United States was estimated at 9.3 million, or about 26 percent of the total stock of the 
“foreign-born” population in the United States (Passel, Capps, and Fix, 2004).  Since it 
focuses on OECD countries, the Docquier and Marfouk (2005) data also do not include 
the large number of migrants from the Middle East and South Asia who are currently 
working in the Persian Gulf.  In 2000 the total stock of migrants working in the Persian 
Gulf was estimated at 9.6 million.  Finally, the Docquier and Marfouk (2005) data only 
relate to the stock of migrants, not flows of migrants.  In other words, these data only 
provide information on the numbers of migrants currently living and working in the 
OECD, and not on the flows of migrants going to (and returning from) the OECD.
8   
Appendix Table 1 shows the countries, poverty, international remittance and skill 
composition of migrant variables included in the new data set.  The data set includes one 
observation for each of the 76 countries and is notable in that it includes 14 observations 
for Sub-Saharan Africa, a region for which poverty, remittances and skill composition of 
migrant data are relatively rare.   
  Put Appendix Table 1 at end of paper – 
Appendix Table 1 reports two different poverty measures.  The first, the 
headcount index, set at $1 per person per day, measures the percent of the population 
living beneath that poverty line at the time of the household budget survey.
9  However, 
the headcount index ignores the “depth of poverty,” that is, the amount by which the 
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average expenditures (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line. 
10  The table 
therefore also reports the poverty gap index, which measures in percentage terms how far 
the average expenditures (income) of the poor fall short of the poverty line.  For instance, 
a poverty gap of 10 percent means that the average poor person’s expenditures (income) 
are 90 percent of the poverty line.  
The remaining data for this study are defined as follows. 
In the literature income is often found to be an important determinant of 
remittances.  In micro-economic studies, income is typically measured in terms of both 
the migrant’s income abroad and the income of his family back home (e.g. Faini, 1994; 
Lucas and Stark, 1985); in macro-economic studies, this variable is usually measured by 
the GDP income of the labor-sending country (e.g. Glytsos, 1997).  While micro-
economic studies tend to find that family income back home has a positive and 
significant effect on the level of remittances sent home (Lucas and Stark, 1985; Cox, Eser 
and Jimenez, 1998), in macro-economic studies the impact of this variable is often 
unclear.  To clarify the impact of income on the determination of remittances, this study 
includes data on the per capita GDP income (and its square) in the labor-sending 
country.
11  
  The distribution of income in the labor-sending country may also affect the flow 
of remittances.  This study therefore includes data on the Gini coefficient, which is 
normalized by household size.  
 The next two variables in this study – percentage of population under age 14 and 
real interest rate in origin country – provide another way for examining the determinants 
of remittances.
12 Since both countries and families tend to be needier when they have a 
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higher proportion of young dependents, it is likely that countries with a higher proportion 
of people under age 14 will receive more remittances.  At the same time, if migrants are 
motivated by investment returns at home, then the variable measuring the real interest 
rate should have a positive and significant impact on the receipt of remittances.  Several 
macro-economic studies have found that migrants tend to remit more money when 
interest rates at home are high and positive (El-Sakka and McNabb, 1999; Lianos, 
1997).
13   
Finally, with respect to financial and political variables, various studies have 
suggested that factors like the costs of remitting money home, exchange rate spread and 
the presence of civil unrest may act as determinants of remittances (Freund and 
Spatafora, 2005; Higgins et al, 2004).  For example, it has been suggested that as the 
costs of remitting money through official channels rise, and the spread between the 
exchange rates offered by remitting agencies and the central exchange increase, then the 
amount of remittance monies will fall.  Similarly, it has been argued that political or civil 
unrest in the country of origin will also cause the amount of remittances to decline.  To 
test the impact of these factors, this study includes the following 3 variables:  (1) the 
costs of remitting US $200 to a labor-sending country; (2) the implicit exchange rate 
spread (defined as the difference between the exchange rate offered by remittance 
agencies and the central exchange rate as quoted by Bloomberg); and (3) the presence of 
civil war in a labor-sending country (1 if yes, otherwise zero).
14  
   11
4.  Country-level Determinants of International Remittances:  IV Results 
In this section the new data are used to analyze the determinants of international 
remittances at the country level.  The basic relationship that we want to analyze can be 
written as: 
Log Ri = α + β1 log γi + β2 log μi +  β3 log xi + εi      (1) 
(i = 1, . ., N)  
 
Where R is the measure of per capita international remittances received by 
country i, α is a fixed-effect reflecting unobservable differences between countries,  
γi,  μi , and xi are a set of demographic, economic and financial/political characteristics, 
respectively, for country i, and ε is an error term.      
The various remittance, demographic, economic and financial variables for 
estimating equation (1) have already been identified and discussed.  Since all of these 
variables (except the “war” variable) are estimated in log terms, the results can be 
interpreted as elasticities of remittances with respect to the relevant variable. 
Equation (1) can be estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS).  However, it is 
possible that several of the right-hand side variables in the model – including those for 
the skill level of migration, the stock of migrants and poverty – may be endogenous to 
remittances.  Reverse causality may be taking place:  remittances may be affecting the 
skill level of migration, the stock of migrants abroad and poverty in the labor-sending 
country.  Using OLS to estimate equation (1) would therefore lead to biased results.   
One possible solution to these problems would be to use panel data to estimate 
equation (1).  Panel data, which includes repeated observations on the same unit (e.g. 
country, household) over two or more time periods, is a good solution because by taking 
“first differences” between various variables it becomes possible to eliminate many of the 
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biases that arise from endogeneity and omitted variables.  Unfortunately, however, panel 
data sets on international migration and remittances in the developing world are relatively 
rare, and there are no panel data available to estimate equation (1). 
Since we are working with cross-section data, one possible way of estimating 
equation (1) is to use instrumental variables.  A good instrumental variable, one that is 
correlated with the explanatory variable but uncorrelated with the outcome variable, can 
eliminate many of the biases that arise from endogenous variables.
15    
The balance of this section will pursue an instrumental variables approach to 
estimating equation (1).
16  The challenge here is to find good instrumental variables for 
the three possible endogenous regressors in the model:  (1) the skill level of migrants; (2) 
the stock of migrants abroad; and (3) poverty.
17  Choosing instrumental variables for 
these regressors, and testing for the relevance of these instruments, can be done as 
follows. 
With respect to the skill level of migrants, two possible instruments exist in our 
data set.  The first instrument is distance (miles) between the labor-sending country and 
the main remittance-sending region (US, OECD (Europe) or the Persian Gulf).
18  This 
variable seems like a good instrument because distance affects the skill level of 
migration:  holding other factors constant, labor-sending countries which are located 
closer to main remittance-sending regions (e.g. Mexico and the US) seem more likely to 
send a higher proportion of low-skilled migrants, because the costs of migration are 
lower.  A second instrument for the skill level of migrants is language.  Here we would 
expect that if the labor-sending country speaks the same language as the main remittance-
sending region, then there would be a higher proportion of high-skilled migration.   
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With respect to the stock of migrants abroad, three possible instruments exist:  
total population in the labor-sending country, population density in the labor-sending 
country and the percent of the urban population in the labor-sending country.  Holding all 
other factors constant, it is expected that all three of these variables will be positively 
related with the stock of migrants abroad.     
For the two poverty variables (poverty headcount and poverty gap), one possible 
instrument is the percentage of the population living in urban areas in the labor-sending 
country.  Since poverty in many developing countries is often concentrated in rural areas, 
ceteris paribus, it is expected that countries with a higher percentage of people living in 
urban areas would have less poverty.
19    
  Tables 1-3 present the first-stage results for the three instrumented variables.   
In Table 1 the two instrumental variables are significant, and the p-values for the F-
statistic of the excluded instruments are less than 0.01 for the prediction of low-skilled 
migration and the F-statistics themselves are over 17.  These results suggest instrument 
relevance.  In Table 2 two of the three instrumental variables are highly significant, and 
when the three variables are combined together (equation (4) in Table 2), the F-statistics 
are over 27.  In Table 3 the instrumental variables are statistically significant for each of 
the poverty variables, and the F-statistics for each equation are over 39.  These results 
suggest instrument relevance. 
  Put Tables 1, 2 and 3 Here –  
  Tables 4 and 5 present the second-stage IV results.  Table 4 shows results when 
the skill composition of migrants is low-skilled (less than 8 years of schooling), while 
Table 5 shows results when migrants are high-skilled (13 or more years of schooling).  In 
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each table columns (1-2) show results for the instrumented skill level of migration 
variable, columns (3-4) show results for the instrumented stock of migrants’ variable, and 
columns (5-6) show the results for the instrumented poverty variable.  In each table the 
overidentification test p-values (for the Hansen J-statistic) are larger than 0.10 for all 
specifications of instrument sets A and B, so we cannot reject that our instruments are 
valid.     
  Put Tables 4 and 5 Here – 
  The IV results for low-skilled migrants in Table 4 reveal five key findings.  First, 
the level of poverty in a labor-sending country has no statistical effect on the amount of 
per capita remittances received by a country.  In Table 4 all of the coefficients for the 
instrumented poverty variables are statistically insignificant.  Second, ceteris paribus, 
countries which export a larger share of low-skilled migrants receive more remittances 
per capita.  The Table 4 results suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of low-
skilled migrants from a labor-sending country will increase the amount of per capita 
remittances received by a country by between 9.1 and 19.8 percent.  Third, the level of 
per capita remittances received by a country is positively related to investment returns at 
home.  All of the coefficients for the real interest rate variable in Table 4 are positive and 
significant.  Fourth, holding all other factors constant, an inverted U-shaped curve seems 
to exist between the level of country GDP income and the receipt of remittances.
20   Four 
of the six coefficients for per capita GDP income variable are positive and significant, 
and three of the coefficients for the square of this term are negative and significant.  
Finally, the amount of per capita remittances received by a country seems to be positively 
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related to the proportion of young dependents at home.  Four of the six coefficients for 
the variable “percent of population under 14 years” are positive and significant. 
  The IV results for high-skilled migrants in Table 5 can be examined with respect 
to the same five findings.  On poverty, four of the six coefficients for the instrumented 
poverty variable are negative and significant.  This suggests that for high-skilled migrants 
poverty does have an impact on the flow of remittances and that more poverty in a labor-
sending country actually leads to less per capita remittances.  More work, possibly on a 
broader set of countries, is needed to identify the reasons for this outcome.  With respect 
to the skill level of migration, Table 5 shows that high-skilled migrants remit less to 
labor-sending countries.  Holding all other factors constant, a 10 percent increase in the 
share of high-skilled migrants from a labor-sending country will reduce the amount of per 
capita remittances received by a country by between 11.2 and 19.7 percent.  On interest 
rates, the level of per capita remittances seems to be positively related to investment 
returns at home.  Just as in Table 4, all of the coefficients for the real interest rate variable 
are positive and significant, and of roughly the same magnitude as those in Table 4.  On 
the relationship between country income and remittances, most – but not all – of the 
coefficients in Table 5 suggest that an inverted-U shaped curve exists between the level 
of per capita GDP income in a country and the receipt of remittances.  Like the previous 
table, these results suggest that middle-income countries receive more per capita 
remittances than low- or high-income countries.  Finally, the amount of per capita 
remittances received by a country seems to be positively related to the proportion of 
young dependents at home.  In Table 5 four of the six coefficients for the variable 
“percent of population under 14 years” are positive and significant. 
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5.  Conclusions  
  This paper has used new data from 76 low- and middle-income developing 
countries to examine the demographic, economic and financial determinants of 
international remittances.   Four main conclusions emerge. 
First, the econometric results presented here suggest that the skill composition of 
migrants does matter in remittance determination:  ceteris paribus, countries which export 
a larger share of high-skilled (educated) migrants receive less per capita remittances than 
countries which export a larger proportion of low-skilled migrants.   Instrumental 
variable results suggest that a 10 percent increase in the share of high-skilled migrants 
from a labor-sending country will reduce the amount of per capita remittances received 
by a county by 11.2 to 19.7 percent, while a similar 10 percent increase in the share of 
low-skilled migrants will increase the level of remittances received by 9.1 to 19.8 
percent.  Although the country-level data presented here cannot provide a definitive 
explanation for these outcomes, one possible explanation is that high-skilled migrants 
remit less because they are more likely to bring family members and to remain in their 
newly adopted country,
21 and so they are less concerned with any eventual return to their 
home country.  By contrast, low-skilled migrants tend to remit more because their 
migration is more temporary in nature and they are more concerned with returning home.  
  Second, the level of poverty in the labor-sending country does not have a positive 
impact on the amount of remittances received by a country.  For low-skilled migrants, the 
level of poverty in a country – defined either in terms of the level or depth of poverty – 
has no statistically significant effect on the amount of remittances received.  For high-




actually has a negative and significant impact on the amount of remittances received.  
Although the country-level data presented here cannot fully explain this outcome, one 
possible reason is that high-skilled migrants may remit more on the basis of investment 
opportunities at home. 
The third conclusion follows from the preceding, namely, that the level of per 
capita remittances received by a country is positively related to investment returns at 
home.  In all versions of the remittance model presented here, all of the coefficients 
measuring real interest rates at home are positively and significantly related to the level 
of per capita remittances received by a country.  In this study, countries with more 
competitive real interest rates receive more per capita remittances.   
The final conclusion is that most – but not all -- of the results presented here 
suggest that an inverted-U shaped curve exists between the level of per capita GDP 
income in a country and the receipt of remittances.  With all other factors held constant, 
the level of per capita remittances received by a country increases until a country has a 
per capita GDP income of about $2,200 per year, and falls thereafter.  In other words, 
middle-income countries receive more per capita remittances than low- or high-income 
countries.  More work is needed to see if this finding holds for a broader selection of 
labor-sending countries.         18
 
 
Table 1.  First-stage IV estimates for percent of low-skilled migrants (less than 8 years of schooling) in total migrants from labor-sending country 
 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Instruments      
Distance from labor-sending country to main remittance-
sending region (US, OECD (Europe) or Persian Gulf) 
-0.148 
    (-2.55)* 
 -0.119 
(-2.20)* 
Language (1 if same language in labor-sending country and 
main remittance-sending region) 
 -0.843 
   (-6.88)** 
-0.820 
  (-6.97)** 
      
Included exogenous variables      








Stock of total migrants from labor-sending country in OECD  0.067 
(1.45) 
0.127 
    (3.85)** 
0.109 
   (3.25)** 






















Gini coefficient in labor-sending country  0.113 
(0.25) 
-0.365 
  (-1.01) 
-0.180 
(-0.47) 






























N 62  62  62 
R
2  0.438 0.640  0.668 
F-statistic, excluded instruments  17.37 18.73  23.49 
P-value  0.000 0.000  0.000 
Notes:  All variables expressed in logs; all equations include 5 regional dummy variables which are not reported here.  Robust t-statistics shown in parentheses.   
Number of observations reduced in table because of missing values for certain variables.  See Appendix Table 1 for countries and survey dates. 
 






Table 2.  First-stage IV estimates for stock of total migrants from labor-sending country in OECD 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Instruments        
Total population in labor-sending country   0.682 
    (5.70)** 
   0.665 
    (6.71)** 
Population density in labor-sending country    0.478 
   (2.85)** 
 0.627 
    (4.49)** 




        
Included exogenous variables        
Percent of low-skilled migrants (less than 8 years schooling) 















































Gini coefficient in labor-sending country  -0.376 
(-0.32) 
-2.684 













































N 62  53  62  53 
R
2  0.691 0.610  0.477  0.811 
F-statistic, excluded instruments  28.77 11.30 8.00  27.90 
P-value  0.000 0.001  0.006  0.000 
Notes:  All variables expressed in logs; all equations include 5 regional dummy variables which are not reported here.  Robust t-statistics shown in parentheses.   
Number of observations reduced in table because of missing values for certain variables.  See Appendix Table 1 for countries and survey dates. 
 




Table 3.  First-stage IV estimates for poverty headcount ($1.08/person/day) and poverty gap 
 
        Poverty headcount                    Poverty gap 
                     (1)                     (2) 
Instruments                                           
Percent urban population in labor-sending country   0.979 
  (2.11)* 
 1.442 
  (2.75)* 
    
Included exogenous variables    
Percent of low-skilled migrants (less than 8 years schooling) in 

































Exchange rate spread in labor-sending country  -0.180 
(-2.18)* 
-0.359 
    (-3.97)** 








N 62  62 
R
2  0.839 0.829 
F-statistic, excluded instruments  52.58 39.64 
P-value  0.000 0.000 
Notes:  All variables expressed in logs; all equations include 5 regional dummy variables which are not reported here.  Robust t-statistics shown in parentheses.   
Number of observations reduced in table because of missing values for certain variables.  See Appendix Table 1 for countries and survey dates. 
 




Table 4.  IV estimates of effects of low-skilled migration (less than 8 years of schooling) on receipt of international remittances 
 
  Dependent variable = Per capita international remittances received by labor-sending country 
Variable  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Instrumented endogenous variables          
Percent of low-skilled migrants (less than 8 years schooling) in 
total migrants from labor-sending country in OECD 
0.914 
     (1.96)* 
1.026 
  (2.05)* 
1.985 
   (3.79)** 
1.949 
   (3.99)** 
1.463 
   (2.91)** 
1.487 
   (3.04)** 

























Exogenous regressors          
Percent of population under 14 years in labor-sending country  3.336 








  (2.12)* 
3.060 
(2.03)* 
Per capita GDP in labor-sending country (constant 2000 dollars)  7.009 








  (2.19)* 
6.951 
(2.12)* 





























   (3.55)** 
0.725 










































   (-3.53)** 
-40.048 






   (-3.46)** 
-40.511 
  (-3.58)** 
N  62 62  53  53 62 62 
Centered R
2  0.533 0.525  0.591  0.592 0.544 0.532 
F-statistic 5.78  4.84  8.86  8.68 7.48 6.94 
Instrument  set  A A  B  B C C 
Anderson LR-statistic (identification/IV relevance test) 37.182  37.934  44.788 44.092  5.416 8.875 
    p-value for Anderson LR-statistic  0.000 0.000  0.000  0.000 0.020 0.002 
Hansen J-statistic (overidentification test)  0.534  0.668  4.439 3.653 n.a.  n.a. 
   p-value for Hansen J-statistic  0.465  0.413  0.109  0.161     
Notes:  All variables expressed in logs; all equations include 5 regional dummy variables which are not reported here.  Robust t-statistics shown in parentheses.   
Number of observations reduced in table because of missing values for certain variables.  See Appendix Table 1 for countries and survey dates. 
*  Significant at the 0.05 level     ** Significant at the 0.01 level         n.a. not applicable as equation is exactly identified 
Instrument Sets: 
A:  Distance, language 
B:  Total population, population density, percent urban population 




Table 5.  IV estimates of effects of high-skilled migration (13 years or more of schooling) on receipt of international remittances 
 
  Dependent variable = Per capita international remittances received by labor-sending country 
Variable  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Instrumented endogenous variables           
Percent of high-skilled migrants (13 years or more schooling) 






   (-3.01)** 
-1.857 
   (-2.89)** 
-1.607 
   (-3.18)** 
-1.566 
  (-3.14)** 












Poverty headcount in labor-sending country ($1.08/person/day)  -0.564 












Exogenous regressors           























































  (3.38)** 
0.643 





















































N  62 62 53  53  62  62 
Centered R
2  0.541 0.529 0.589  0.580  0.547  0.531 
F-statistic 5.93  4.77  8.66 7.79  6.50 6.14 
Instrument  set  A  A  B B  C C 
Anderson LR-statistic (identification/IV relevance test)  33.013 32.383 50.923 49.740  6.177  9.656 
    p-value for Anderson LR-statistic  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000  0.013  0.001 
Hansen J-statistic (overidentification  test)  0.178 0.270 3.454 2.655  n.a.  n.a. 
   p-value for Hansen J-statistic  0.673  0.603  0.178  0.265     
Notes:  All variables expressed in logs; all equations include 5 regional dummy variables which are not reported here.  Robust t-statistics shown in parentheses.   
Number of observations reduced in table because of missing values for certain variables.  See Appendix Table 1 for countries and survey dates. 
*  Significant at the 0.05 level    ** Significant at the 0.01 level       n.a. not applicable as equation is exactly identified 
Instrument sets: 
A:  Distance, language 
B:  Total population, population density, percent urban population 




Appendix Table 1.  Summary of data on poverty, international remittances and skill composition of migrants 
 


































Albania 1996  0.62  0.07 0.291 499 151.2 46.2  18.4  30.1 
Algeria 1995  1.16  0.24 0.353 2460 80.6 76.7  14.1  34.1 
Argentina 1998  1.15  0.05 0.498 43 1.2 16.0  48.2  28.0 
Armenia 1998  4.98  1.09 0.36 10 2.6 18.0  47.0  25.9 
Azerbaijan 2001  3.67  0.63 0.365 104 12.8 25.9 49.9 31.0 
Bangladesh 2000  36.03  8.1 0.317 1958 15.1 41.3 36.3 37.5 
Belarus 2000  0.11  0.07 0.303 53 5.3 44.8  29.3  18.7 
Bolivia 1999  26.18  15.34 0.577 72 8.9 11.9  50.9  39.6 
Brazil 1999  8.01  1.88 0.591 1190 6.9 22.9  43.4  29.6 
Bulgaria 2001  3.02  0.59 0.343 421 51.7 52.8  16.4  15.7 
Burkina Faso  1998  44.85  14.42 0.468 62 5.8 57.7  30.1  48.4 
Cambodia 1997  34.08  9.68 0.403 10 0.9 48.5  25.7  40.7 
Chile 2000  0.97  0.18 0.576 395 25.6 16.9  47.4  27.8 
China 1999  0.46  0.14 0.315 21,283 16.8 29.7 48.0 24.8 
Colombia 2000  8.68  3.42 0.575 1578 37.4 16.6  41.7  32.8 
Costa Rica  2000  2.01  0.66 0.466 120 30.7 16.9 45.0 31.7 
Cote d'Ivoire  1998  15.53  3.82 0.437 49 3.2 47.6 30.7 43.3 
Croatia 2000  0.09  0.06 0.313 536 121.8 54.2  20.5  17.0 
Czech Republic  1996  0.12  0.12 0.258 452 43.8 39.4 33.1 16.4 
Dominican 
Republic 2000  1.09  0.19 0.521 1689 203.4 30.8  26.5  35.0 
Ecuador 1998  15.78  6.32 0.535 794 65.1 25.4  28.0  34.4 
Egypt 1999  3.09  0.43 0.344 3235 49 18.3  58.9  35.9 
El Salvador  2000  18.94  8.54 0.519 1750 277.8 41.1 19.1 35.6 
Estonia 1998  0.08  0.02 0.376 0.1 0.1 32.0  40.1  18.0 
Ethiopia 2000  22.97  4.82 0.3 53 0.8 21.0  48.7  45.5 
Gambia 1998  27.07  9.04 0.502 8 6.1 51.4  20.4  41.2 
Georgia 2000  2.83  0.88 0.266 94 20 27  51.9  21.6 
Ghana 1998  40.51  15.06 0.407 29 1.6 24.9  44.1  41.2 
Guatemala 1998  7.89  1.59 0.558 456 42.2 47.5 19.0 44.1 
Guyana 1998  2.98  0.6 0.445 15 18.8 17.8 44.2 30.7 
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Honduras 1999  20.74  7.45 0.562 320 50.8 36.3 23.8 41.7 
Hungary 1999  0.26  0.15 0.277 26 2.5 31.7  39.1  16.9 
India 1999  19.26  3.88 0.35 11,002 10.8 21.8 60.5 34.1 
Indonesia 2000  7.19  1.04 0.303 1190 5.7 28.8 46.3 30.2 
Iran 1998  0.26  0.04 0.441 500 8.1 17.0  58.5  35.2 
Jamaica 2000  0.41  0.06 0.388 789 303.4 19.5  42.8  33.0 
Jordan 1997  0.36  0.10 0.36 1665 370 16.4 55.6 39.3 
Kazakhstan 2001  0.11  0.02 0.313 81 5.4 34.3 49.2 27.5 
Kenya 1997  20.13  4.84 0.425 533 18.9 20.4 44.8 44.1 
Kyrgyz Republic  2000  1.97  0.21 0.302 43 8.7 34.7 52.7 34.8 
Latvia 1998  1.53  0.67 0.336 3 1.2 22.3  51.2  17.9 
Lesotho 1995  36.40  18.97 0.631 0.6 0.3 21.1 49.6 40.7 
Lithuania 2000  0.53  0.18 0.318 2 0.6 42.7  29.1  19.8 
Macedonia 2000  1.51  0.64 0.206 80.0 40.0 52.2 19.6 22.1 
Madagascar 1999  66.03  29.42 0.418 105 6.9 36.9 43.4 44.8 
Malawi 1997  41.66  14.75 0.503 0.7 0.1 24.6  43.2  46.2 
Malaysia 1997  0.17  0.02 0.491 987 42.9 17.6  59.2  33.7 
Mali 2001  36.35  11.86 0.4 82 7.1 81.2  10.9  48.2 
Mexico 2000  5.87  1.57 0.518 6573 67.1 48.2  14.4  33.7 
Moldova 1999  32.24  9.93 0.368 0.6 0.1 26.7 45.8 22.9 
Mongolia 1998  27.02  8.08 0.302 5.5 2.3 17.2  61.1  35.1 
Morocco 1998  0.56  0.08 0.394 2011 72.3 70.6  12.9  33.4 
Nepal 1995  34.42  8.96 0.376 44 2.1 19.4  47.2  40.9 
Nicaragua 1998  44.68  16.62 0.452 200 41.6 19.8  38.5  42.0 
Nigeria 1996  79.28  51.36 0.696 947 8.3 12.9 65.0 45.3 
Pakistan 1996  29.49  6.46 0.302 1284 10.2 38.9 38.6 41.3 
Panama 2000  7.2  2.28 0.565 16 5.5 6.7  57.7  31.9 
Paraguay 1999  14.86  6.8 0.568 148 27.9 25.7 45.6 39.6 
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Philippines 2000  15.48  2.98 0.46 125 1.6 12.8  67.1  37.5 
Poland 2000  0.13  0.06 0.329 639 16.5 30.0  39.5  19.2 
Romania 2000  2.14  0.59 0.302 2 0.1 34.5  31.3  18.3 
Russia 2000  6.14  1.19 0.456 363 2.4 26.2 51.1 18.2 
Slovak Republic  1996  0.49  0.06 0.258 4 0.7 37.9  20.0  20.5 
South Africa  2000  10.71  1.74 0.577 38 0.8 10.8 62.6 33.5 
Sri Lanka  1999  7.58  1.49 0.332 1052 55.6 30.7  39.5  26.2 
Tanzania 2000  56.99  20.64 0.346 35 1.0 22.9 51.3 44.0 
Thailand 2000  1.93  0.05 0.431 867 14.1 28.9  44.6  25.6 
Tunisia 2000  0.32  0.07 0.408 796 82.9 73.0 14.9 30.2 
Turkey 2000  0.87  0.21 0.4 4560 67.6 79.1  8.8  30.7 
Uganda 1999  26.84  7.74 0.43 232 10.7 23.5  46.2  50.3 
Ukraine 1999  2.92  0.62 0.289 84 1.7 41.5 33.1 17.9 
Venezuela 2000  8.87  2.7 0.44 217 8.9 11.1 60.1 33.7 
Vietnam 1998  3.80  0.48 0.355 3200 40.7 28.5 40.0 33.5 
Yemen 1998  10.21  2.3 0.334 1202 72.8 33.7  34.5  48.3 
        
Notes:  All poverty, inequality, income and remittance data from year of survey; all other data from 2000.    
        
Sources:  All poverty and inequality data from World Bank, Povcal Net.  All remittance data (except as noted in endnote 3) from International Monetary Fund,   
Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook.   Data on skill composition of migrants from Docquier and Marfouk (2005), and population data from World   








                                                                              Notes 
 
 
1 These figures for official international remittances do not include the large – and unknown – amount of international remittances 
which return to developing countries through unrecorded, informal channels. 
2 Recent works on the skill composition of migrants include Niimi and Ozden (2006) and Faini (2003, 2007).  Faini (2007) appeared 
as this paper was going to press. 
3 Low-income and middle-income countries are those which are classified as such by the World Bank (2000, pp. 334-335).  Low-
income countries are those with 1999 GNP per capita $756 or less; middle-income countries are those with 1999 GNP per capita of 
$756-$9,265. 
4 Although the IMF data on international remittances include most countries, some countries do not report remittances data to the IMF.  
For example, in 2000 about 85 countries did not report any remittances data to the IMF; this list of countries includes at least 5 
countries which are known to be large, labor-sending countries.  For these 5 countries (Algeria, China, Gambia, Malaysia and 
Vietnam) remittances data are therefore taken from estimates made by the World Bank, Global Economic Prospects (2006:  Table 
4A.1.1).   
5 For a recent attempt to estimate the size of unrecorded, informal remittances in the developing world as a whole, see Freund and 
Spatafora (2005). 
6 For a full list of these 157 developing countries, see World Bank (2000, pp. 334-335). 
7 For the purposes of this study, OECD (Europe) includes 18 countries:  Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and United 
Kingdom.  No migration data are available for Greece, Iceland, Poland, Slovak Republic and Turkey. 
8 It should also be noted that the Docquier and Marfouk (2005) data do not distinguish between permanent and temporary migrants; 
rather these data only count the total number of people who are “foreign born” and of working age living in the OECD.  
9 To ensure compatibility across countries, all of the poverty lines in Appendix Table 1 are international poverty lines, set at estimates 
of $1.08 per person per day in 1993 purchasing power parity (PPP) exchange rates.  The PPP exchange rates are used so that $1.08 is 
worth roughly the same in all countries.  PPP values are calculated by pricing a representative bundle of goods in each country and 
comparing the local cost of that bundle with the U.S. dollar cost of the same bundle.  In calculating PPP values, the comparison of 
local costs with U.S. costs is done using conversion estimates produced by the World Bank.  
10 In this paper the terms “expenditure” and “income” are used interchangeably.  
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11 Data on per capita GDP income (constant 2000 US dollars) in this study come from World Bank, Development Data Platform 
(2006).   
12 One reviewer suggested that the level of education in the labor-sending country should also be included in the study.  However, data 
on educational attainment are rather sparse for many developing countries, especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa.  For example, 
adding information on educational attainment – such as percent of country population over age 25 with secondary school education 
(from Barro and Lee, 2000) – would have reduced the size of the data set from 76 to 38 countries.    
13 Data on population under 14 years of age and real interest rates come from World Bank, Development Data Platform (2006).  
14 Data on the costs of remitting US $200 to a particular country come from the International Monetary Fund, Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions.  Data on exchange rate spread come from Western Union, as reported in Freund 
and Spatafora (2005).  Data on the presence of civil war are from Fearon and Laitin (2003).   
15 While such an instrumental variables approach is good for dealing with endogeneity, it is unable to control for the unobserved 
country characteristics that are likely to affect the receipt of remittances by a country. 
16 Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of equation (1) are available from the author upon request. 
17 One reviewer suggested that the level of income inequality (in a country) might also be endogenous in equation (1).  However, three 
factors should be noted:  (1) in most countries the level of income inequality (as measured by the Gini coefficient) changes very 
slowly over time; (2) recent studies of remittances and inequality which are based on large, nationally-representative household 
surveys have found that international remittances have only a small impact on the level of income inequality in a country (see Adams, 
2004; Acosta et al 2006); and (3) in this data set, it proved impossible to identify suitable instrumental variables for income inequality. 
18 In this study distance between the labor-sending country and the main remittance-sending region (US, OECD (Europe) or Persian 
Gulf) is measured for each labor-sending country as the miles between the capital of that country and the main region from which it 
receives remittances.  For example, for Latin American countries it is the distance to the United States, for North African countries it 
is the distance to OECD (Europe) and for South Asian countries it is distance to the Persian Gulf.  For those countries (like Egypt and 
Jordan) which send migrant workers to both the OECD (Europe) and the Persian Gulf, the distance variable is calculated on the basis 
of where that country sends the largest proportion of its migrant workers. 
19 In this data set the simple correlation between the percent of urban population and the poverty headcount is -0.518. 
20Using a different data set and different assumptions, Adams (2006) also finds that an inverted U-shaped curve exists between the 




                                                                                                                                                                                       
21 On this point, one reviewer noted that if high-skilled migrants remit less because they are more likely to stay in their newly adopted 
country, then the key variable is “duration of stay” rather than the skill level of migrants.  Unfortunately, however, in this data set no 
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